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城管问题的进化博弈分析 被引量:1

Evolutionary game analysis of city management problems
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摘要 针对近几年来频繁出现的城管冲突事件,基于博弈参与者有限理性的假设,利用博弈理论,探讨城市管理者与菜贩问题的解决方法.首先从静态建立两群体的博弈模型,分析其策略均衡,其次着重从进化动态角度进行研究,得到博弈参与者的复制动态系统,利用动力系统理论,分析进化稳定性条件,最后揭示了影响双方进化稳定策略的因素.结果表明,文章的动静态博弈的分析对更好地规范市场,塑造良好文明城市形象具有一定的指导意义. Considering the frequent violent conflicts about city management in recent years, this paper adopts the evolutionary game theory to study how to solve the conflicts between city managers and greengrocers based on the bounded rationality of the game participants. Firstly, the static game models of two groups are established and the strategic equilibriums are analyzed. Then, the replicated dynamic systems of game participants are established for the evolutionary dynamics and their evolutionary stability condition is analyzed by using the dynamic system theory. Finally, the factors influencing both evolutionary stable strategies are revealed. Therefore, the results obtained in this paper have important significance in regulating the market and molding a good civilized city image.
出处 《江西理工大学学报》 CAS 2015年第5期104-109,共6页 Journal of Jiangxi University of Science and Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(61364015 F030201)
关键词 进化博弈理论 静态博弈分析 复制动态系统 进化稳定策略 城市管理 evolutionary game theory static game analysis replicated dynamic system evolutionary stable strategy city management
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