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关于自我知识及其与内容外在论的冲突

On the Conflict between Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism
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摘要 传统哲学一般认为,我们通过内省来认识内部世界,通过感知来认识外部世界。我们对自我知识的理解正是建立在内省这种独特的获取方式之上的。自我知识的一系列特性有赖于内容的内在性。支持内省理论的人都会假定有内实在域的存在,内实在域中的对象构成思想的内容。可是克里普克-普特南的历史-因果指称理论则认为,内容外在于心智,意义并不在头脑之中。仅仅通过内省,我们并不知道自己思想的内容是什么。然而以克里普克-普特南的方式将概念、语词、内容捆绑在一起,又很可能会致使窄内容出现,从而把问题带入困境。所以,否定内容外在论与否定自我知识的两方都无法达成各自的目标。塞恩斯伯里和泰的"概念的起源主义理论",同样无法解决自我知识与内容外在论的冲突。有效解决两者冲突的途径应当是寻求两者的兼容性,而密立根的理论正是解决这一冲突的强大工具。 On traditional philosophical views,our knowledge of the internal world is acquired by the method of introspection,which is compared with perception,the way we know about the external world.Our conception of self-knowledge is derived from the method it is obtained,i.e.introspection.The distinctive characterizations of self-knowledge rest on the assumption that mental contents are internal.Proponents of the theory of introspection usually adopt the hypothesis that there is an'inner real realm'which is filled with'inner objects'that are constitutive to the mental content.Contrastingly,according to Kripke-Putnam's causal-historical theory of reference,the content is external,and the meaning is not in the head.As a result,there is no way we can know the content by introspection.However,a developed version of Kripe-Putnam's theory tends to build a tight connection between concept,word,content,and therefore supports a theory of narrow content,which is problematic.It seems that we cannot have a coherent account of the knowledge of the internal world simply by denying content externalism or the existence of self-knowledge.The problem is not dissolved in Sainsbury and Tye's originalist theory of concepts as well.A more reasonable solution is to seek for a deeper compatibility of self-knowledge and content externalism.Millikan's theory is a powerful means to this end.
作者 张子夏
出处 《浙江社会科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第10期89-96,158,共8页 Zhejiang Social Sciences
关键词 自我知识 内容外在论 内省 因果—历史指标理论 密立根 self-knowledge content externalism causal theory of reference originalist theory of concepts
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