摘要
不同所有制背景下企业环境保护责任、动机及外部条件存在显著差异,大多数研究不区分所有权性质,只是笼统地认为环境规制能促进企业技术创新,却忽视了公司治理层面的调节作用。基于重污染行业国有企业和民营上市公司2009—2013年的实证分析发现:1波特假说在不同所有制企业的有效性不同:外生环境规制对企业技术创新作用不显著但作用方向相反,其一般对民营企业存在负向影响,对国有企业存在正向影响,内生环境规制对国有企业和民营企业均存在显著正向影响;2高管激励在环境规制与技术创新间存在调节作用,但只在民营企业中作用显著。高管激励越大,外生环境规制对民营技术创新的挤出效应越小,内生环境规制对民营企业技术创新的补偿效应则越大,但在国有企业样本中,未发现相关证据。
There are different of the enterprise environmental protection responsibility,motivation and external conditions between state-owned and private firm.the existing research given environmental regulation can promote enterprise technology innovation are likely to be biased.Aiming at to resolve this problem,and exploratory research on the effect of executive incentive in environmental regulation and technology innovation,this article is based on the state of heavy pollution industry and private listed companies from 2009 to 2013of the empirical analysis it is concluded that：（1）the effectiveness of ＂porter hypothesis＂ are different in different ownership firms：exogenous environmental regulations of state-owned enterprises has positive influence on technology innovation,and has negative influence of private enterprises,but the effect was not significant;The endogenous environment regulations are very positive in promoting ＂ Porter hypothesis＂ effectiveness of state-owned and private enterprises,and stronger in state-owned enterprises.（2）the executive incentive has adjust action in environmental regulation and technology innovation,but only remarkable in private enterprises.Executive incentive is larger,the ＂ Crowding Out＂ of environmental regulation on technical innovation is the smaller or ＂Innovation Effect＂ is bigger.But in the state-owned enterprise samples,we did not find the relevant evidence.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第19期66-71,共6页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71232004)
关键词
高管激励
环境规制
技术创新
波特假说
Executive Incentive
Environmental Regulations
Technology Innovation
Porter Hypothesis
