摘要
为考察审计参与人的博弈过程及其结果,文章构建了涉及管理者和审计师等局中人的博弈模型,在此基础上引入审计师声誉机制和内部监督机制,利用比较制度实验经济学的方法对比了两种机制对管理者和审计师行为的影响及其对审计质量的改善效果。研究发现:(1)基准实验中管理者更多地选择较高的舞弊水平,而审计师更多地选择较高的审计力度,实现了福利水平最劣的均衡结果;(2)偏好性的声誉机制对审计质量的改善效果不显著,内部监督机制从根本上减少了舞弊的发生,显著地改善了审计质量;(3)审计力度在内部监督机制与审计质量之间存在完全中介效应。文章对于如何通过治理机制来有效地提高审计质量具有一定的参考价值。
To investigate the game process and results between different audit agents,this paper constructs a game model involving a manager and an auditor,introduces auditor reputation mechanism and internal supervision mechanism,and compares the effects of these two mechanisms on the behavior of managers and auditors and their role in the improvement of audit quality by comparative institutional experiment economics.It arrives at the conclusions as follows：firstly,in the benchmark experiment,managers are more inclined to select high-level fraud and auditors are more inclined to high-degree audit,realizing the equilibrium of the worst welfare results;secondly,preference-based reputation mechanism plays a poor role in the improvement of audit quality,and internal supervision system plays a fundamental role in the reduction in the occurrence of fraud,thereby significantly improving audit quality;thirdly,audit strength has a mediating effect on the relationship between internal supervision mechanism and audit quality.It provides certain reference for effective improvement of audit quality through governance mechanisms.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第10期132-144,共13页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71372094
71132001
71172068
71533002)
关键词
审计质量
声誉
内部监督
比较制度实验
中介效应
audit quality
reputation
internal supervision
comparative institutional experiment
mediating effect
