摘要
在不同初始条件下,矿业权市场的产权安排、价格修正、内化机制,以及矿业权规制中存在的政府分权、逆向选择等因素是引致我国矿业权市场矿权重叠、采富弃贫、掠夺开采、环境弱化、成本次优等效率差异性的重要原因。本文选择从产权与规制的角度,构建了一个内生性与外生性相结合的分析框架,来解析我国矿业权规制的基础、政策及其效应问题。研究认为,未来我国矿业权规制的调整,一方面应着重于对矿业权规制中政府分权及竞争关系的重塑,以解决矿业权市场存在的"条块矛盾"及收益分配问题;另一方面须注重对政策工具的调整与优化,以解决矿业权市场的"价格修正"以及外部性风险等问题。
The key factors such as mineral rights arrangement, price revising, internalizing mechanism, and governmenl decentralization and regulation competition could induce to the difference of efficiency of mineral rights market such as overlapping conflict, mining rich and abandoning poor, extensive mining, deteriorating environment, second best cost, resource curse etc. From an angle of resource rights and regulation, the paper structured an analytical frame, which involved endogenous factors and exogenous factors, to interpret the basis and the public policy and its＇ effect of mineral rights regulation. So, as for the revise of the mineral regulation in future, one hand we should emphasize the re - design of the government decentralization and competition relationship, sol- ving the problem of contradiction between central government and local government and profit distribution. On the other hand, we should focus on the optimization of the policy tools, resolving the problem of externalization or price revising, to shape one perfect and sufficient mineral market.
出处
《中国行政管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第10期129-134,共6页
Chinese Public Administration
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"我国资源富集区矿业权重置的风险传导与规制优化研究"(项目编号:13CGL116)
关键词
资源产权
矿业权市场
矿业权规制
政府竞争
Resource Property Rights
Mineral Rights
Mineral Regulation
Government Competition
