摘要
本文通过收集整理2007—2011年中国土地市场网上公示的每宗工业用地出让结果信息而获得了城市政府出让工业用地的面板数据。利用空间计量经济学工具,笔者发现省内经济实力相近的城市,尤其是经济强市之间存在着土地引资的恶性竞争,即竞相扩大工业用地的出让规模和协议出让比例。同时还发现,市委书记的个人禀赋特征也会影响地方政府的工业用地出让行为。这些实证结果都暗示辖区间土地引资竞争在很大程度上是地方领导晋升竞争的产物。
We collected the detail information of each deal of state-owned industrial land conveyance from http： //www. landchina, corn and then obtained the city-level panel data during 2007 and 2011. Em- ploying the tools of the spatial econometrics, we find that there are rat races to compete for investment by supplying industrial land among the cities with similar scale of economy, especially the giant ones in one province. That is, all of them try to supply more industrial land with higher ratio of agreement-granted land. Meanwhile, besides the jurisdictional endowments, individual political endowments of the secretaries also have some significant impact on how the industrial land is conveyed by the city governments. These results imply that the competition for investment by supplying industrial land among local governments are rooted in the political promotion competition among the local leaders.
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第9期5-17,共13页
Economic Theory and Business Management
基金
教育部2011中国特色社会主义经济建设协同创新中心项目"认知
适应和引领经济新常态研究"
首都高校学科群建设项目"提升北京创新能力打造环渤海经济升级新引擎"
北京大学-林肯中心2012-2013年研究基金的资助
关键词
工业用地出让
晋升竞争
辖区竞争
industrial land conveyance
promotion competition
jurisdictional competition
