摘要
本文使用2012年和2013年全国30个省级行政单位的政府债务数据,以及地方官员个人履历,从官员激励、工作经历、政治关联和政治俘获四个维度,首次考察了各省主要领导的动机和行为影响地方政府债务规模的渠道。我们发现:(1)当省委书记年龄较大时,年龄与地方政府债务规模正相关,此时其经济激励优于政治晋升激励;当省委书记年龄较小时,年龄与地方政府债务规模负相关。(2)有经济工作背景的省委书记倾向于扩大政府债务规模。(3)省委书记与中央的政治关联会影响地方政府债务规模。(4)省委书记面临的来自本地精英的政治俘获压力越大,地方政府债务规模越小。本文的发现对于理解和防范地方政府债务问题具有重要的政策含义。
This paper investigates mechanisms that provincial main leaders＇motivation and behavior which influence local government debt scale for the first time,from four dimensions such as official incentives,work experience,political connections and elite capture,by using government debt data of 30 provincial administrative units in 2012 and 2013,and local officials＇resume.We find that when provincial party secretaries are elder,age is positively related to local government debt scale,and their economic incentives are bigger than political promotion incentives.On the contrary,when provincial party secretaries are younger,age is negatively related to local government debt scale.Provincial party secretaries with economic work experiences tend to expand the scale of government debt.Political connections between provincial party secretaries and central government will affect local government debt scale,depending on the trade-off between ＂following effects＂and ＂preferential effects＂.When ＂following effects＂are bigger than＂preferential effects＂,the strength of political connections is negatively related to local government debt scale,and vice versa.What＇s more,the greater elite capture pressure faced by provincial party secretaries,the smaller local government debt scale.Our finds have important policy implications for the understanding and prevention of local government debt＇s issues.
出处
《教学与研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第7期32-41,共10页
Teaching and Research
关键词
地方债务
官员特征
政治关联
政治俘获
省委书记
local government debt
characteristics of officials
political connections
elite capture
provincial party secretaries
