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从违约事件看P2P借款方与平台间的博弈 被引量:1

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摘要 本文由案例分析切入P2P网贷违约问题,采用博弈论的视角建立了违约追偿博弈模型。博弈模型的推导结论显示,P2P平台不追偿的效用高于追偿的成本,因此加大了借款方违约的意愿,提高了借款方违约的概率。公共管理应从加大P2P平台不追偿的成本入手,以有效解决P2P违约问题。
作者 潘宁
出处 《中国物价》 2015年第7期47-50,共4页 China Price
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