摘要
为研究公平关切对闭环供应链成员决策的影响,基于Stackelberg理论,分别研究零售商公平关切、零售商和制造商皆公平关切两种情形。研究表明,仅零售商公平关切时批发价契约时的批发价低于分散式决策的情形,零售价则相反,废旧品供给量不变。零售商和制造商皆公平关切时零售商公平关切和批发价成反比,制造商公平关切和批发价成正比,回收转移价格则相反。另外,制造商和零售商过度公平关切导致闭环供应链系统的损失和社会环保程度的降低。
In order to study the influence of fairness concern and reference dependence of the closed - loop supply chain members on the optimal pricing decisions, based on the theory of Stackelberg game, we explore the two cases when only re- tailers have fair concerns, as well as when manufacturers and retailers all have fairness concerns. Numerical simulation shows that when only retailers have fair concerns, the manufacturers＇wholesale price under the whole price contract is lower than the case when it is decentralized decision - making, and we have the opposite conclusion on the retail price. When manufacturers and retailers all have fairness concerns and reference dependence, the manufacturer~ wholesale price is a de- creasing function of the retailer~ fairness concern and reference preference, an increasing function of their fairness concern and reference preference, and we have the opposite conclusion on the manufacturer＇s recycling transfer price. Further, when the competition between the retailers and manufactures is excessively high, it will lead to the low efficiency of the closed - loop and poor environmental conditions.
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第13期192-195,200,共5页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
教育部人文社科青年基金项目"基于公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链优化模型研究"(12YJC630180)
江苏省研究生培养创新工程项目"考虑渠道结构和公平关切的闭环供应链定价模型研究"(KYZZ_0230)
