摘要
小微企业每年解决全国70％的新增和再就业人数、完成全国80％的新产品开发、缴纳全国50％的税收、创造全国60％的生产总值，却只能得到商业银行6％～9％的信贷额度，小微企业贷款难问题始终困扰着政府机构。通过建立商业银行与小微企业的逆向选择博弈模型，对贷款审查与欺瞒贷款进行博弈分析，分析结果显示：可以通过降低商业银行监管成本、提高监管效率、加大对小微企业惩罚力度、提高小微企业欺瞒骗贷成本、降低欺瞒骗贷收益来降低商业银行的审查概率和小微企业选择隐瞒贷款真实用途或挪用贷款行为的概率，进而减轻或消除构建商业银行与小微企业良好信贷关系的障碍。
Small and micro enterprises recruit 70 percent of newly increased and reemployment labor force, complete 80 percent of new product development, pay 50 percent of tax and create 60 percent of gross domestic product every year in China. However, by contrast, small and micro enterprises can only get 6 percent to 9 percent of line of credit of commercial banks. The government agencies have been plagued by the loan problem of small and micro enterprises. By building the game model of adverse selection between commercial banks and small and micro enterprises, the paper makes a game analysis of review and fraud of loan and draws the following conclusion： by cutting the cost of supervision and improving the efficiency of supervision of commercial banks, enhancing the punishment on small and micro enterprises, increasing the cost of small and micro enterprises＇ obtaining fraudulent loan and decreasing the benefit of fraudulent loan, it＇ s possible to reduce the probabilities of review of commercial bank and small and micro enterprises＇ concealing real purpose of loan or embezzling loan to lessen or remove the barrier to the establishment of good credit relations between commercial banks and small and micro enterprises.
出处
《天津商业大学学报》
2015年第4期49-56,共8页
Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce
关键词
小微企业
商业银行
信贷关系
博弈论
small and micro enterprises
commercial banks
credit relations
game analysis
