摘要
本文考察了风险投资的"逐名"动机对上市公司会计信息质量、IPO后长期业绩的影响。研究发现:第一,风险投资支持的公司在IPO时的盈余管理程度要高于无风投支持的公司,考虑锁定期的可能影响后这一结果仍然显著,并且风投的持股比例、派出董事情况、声誉以及政治联系都与盈余管理程度正相关;第二,风险投资支持的公司在IPO后的盈余管理程度要显著高于无风投支持的公司,配合减持需要、创造有利退出条件是重要原因;第三,风险投资支持的公司其IPO后长期市场业绩要低于无风投支持的公司,并且IPO时盈余管理程度越大、IPO后的长期业绩也越差。研究从会计信息角度系统考察了风险投资的可能负面作用。即为了顺利上市和退出,风投支持公司的盈余管理程度要高于无风投支持的公司,但这在一定程度上也造成了风投支持公司上市后的长期业绩走低。
This paper investigates the impact of VC's incentive to build reputation,grandstanding,on the earnings equity and long- term performance after IPO. Firstly,in IPO the earnings management of companies backed by VC is more aggressive than companies not backed by VC. The control of VC,reputation and political connection of VC are all positively correlated with the earnings management in IPO; Secondly,after IPO the earnings management in following years of companies backed by VC is more aggressive than companies not backed by VC. The main purpose is to facilitate the withdrawal through selling shares; Thirdly,the long- run performance of companies backed by VC underperform that not backed by VC. The more earnings management in IPO,the worse the long- run performance is.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第5期20-27,94,共8页
Accounting Research
基金
自然科学基金项目(71002044)
中央高校基本科研业务费(2013221015)的资助
