1Beasley,M.S. An empirical analysis of the relationbetween the board of director composition and Finan-cial statement fraud[J]. The Accounting Review, 1996. 1. 被引量：1
2BennedsenM_ ,Fosgerau M Nielsen K. The strategicchoice of control allocation and ownership distribu-tion in closely held corporations [J].Working Paper,Copenhagen Business School,2003. 被引量：1
4DavidF.Larker and Seott A. Riehardson,2005,FeesPaid to Audit Firms,Aeerual Choiees and CorporateGovernance,Journal of Accounting Research,2004. 6. 被引量：1
5Jon Cauley , Richard Cornes , Todd Sandler. Stakeholder incentives and reforms in China's state-owned enterprises: A common-property theory[J]. China Economic Review,1999,(10): 191-206. 被引量：1
6Mirrlees,J.The Optimal Structure of Authority and Incentives within an Organization[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1976(7):40-45. 被引量：1
7Groves, Theodore, Yongmiao Hong, John McMillan and Barry Naughton. Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994,(2):30-35. 被引量：1
8Hora Guidry,Andrew J Leone,Steve Rock.Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management. Journal of Accountancy . 1999 被引量：1
9Ciscel D H,Carroll T M.The determinants of executive salaries: an econometric survey. The Review of Economics and Statistics . 1980 被引量：1
