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国际碳排放权交易中需求垄断效应研究——以“附件B国家”控制进口为例 被引量:1

Research on Monopsony Effect of International Carbon Emissions Trading:Taking Import Control of Annex B Countries for Example
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摘要 利用边际减排成本曲线分析国际碳交易理论逻辑,并预测"附件B国家"间自由交易结果,然后构建无谓损失和进口成本节约理论模型分析国际碳交易市场需求垄断效应,证实碳排放权进口国设定最高进口比例可以减少完成减排义务的总成本,扩大国际碳交易净收益,而且存在使总成本最小的进口比例。发展中国家应该加强合作与碳资源管理,争取国际碳交易和减排谈判的话语权,同时应尽快进行相关产权制度创新,建立国内市场化交易机制。 This article makes use of the marginal emission reduction cost curve to analyze the logic of international carbon emissions Wading theory and predict the results of free Wading among Annex B countries. Then it constructs a theoretical model of deadweight loss and import cost saving to analyze the monopsony effect in the international carbon emission trading market. It is confirmed that the import countries of carbon emission right can reduce the total cost of the reduction obligation by setting up the highest import proportion, increase the net earnings of international carbon emission trading, and keep the import proportion with minimum total cost. The developing countries should strengthen cooperation and carbon resource management, strive for the right to speak in international carbon emission Wading and negotiations, carry out the innovation of the related property rights system as soon as possible, and establish domestic market Wading mechanism.
作者 张云 杨来科
出处 《当代财经》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第6期97-106,共10页 Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金 国家社会科学基金项目"国际碳交易视阈下碳排放责任界定及经济利益测度研究"(14BGJ010)
关键词 国际碳排放权交易 需求垄断效应 无谓损失 进口成本节约 international carbon emission Wading monopsony effect deadweight loss import cost saving
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