摘要
本文以管理防御理论为基础,编制互惠量表并建立回归模型,检验机构投资者互惠行为与上市企业非效率投资的关系。研究发现:机构投资者广义互惠与企业非效率投资显著负相关;机构投资者负互惠对企业非效率投资有显著正向影响;而机构投资者平衡互惠与企业非效率投资相关性不显著。本文探索性地应用互惠量表研究机构投资者持股对企业非效率投资的治理效应,为改善企业投资效率提供了新的分析视角。
Based on the theory of managerial entrenchment, this paper develops reciprocity scale and regression model to investigate the relation between reciprocal behavior of institutional investors and inefficient investment of listed companies. The findings indicate that generalized reciprocity of institutional investors has a significant negative correlation with inefficient investment; while negative reciprocity of them has a significant positive impact on inefficient investment; but there is no significant correlation between balanced reciprocity and inefficient investment. Using reciprocity scale, this study takes an exploratory look at the governance effect of institutional investors holding on inefficiency investment. Also, the research provides a new visual angle for improving the efficiency of investment.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第3期40-45,共6页
Forecasting
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272118)
高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20136118110008)
陕西省高校重点学科专项资金建设项目(107-00X902)
关键词
机构投资者
互惠理论
非效率投资
管理防御
institutional investor
reciprocity theory
inefficient investment
managerial entrenchment
