摘要
以政治激励和税收努力为理论基础构建理论框架,提出两个研究假说,并运用2000~2012年省际平衡面板数据构建了动态实证模型,运用系统GMM方法着重分析超计划GDP增长和税收计划对地方财政收入预决算偏离的影响。主要结论有：地方政府在晋升激励之下策略性影响预算编制依据GDP计划增长率与政绩考核核心指标GDP实际增长率,GDP超计划增长为地方政府追求超预算收入奠定经济基础;税务部门在税收计划刚性考核压力下会提高税收努力程度,税收计划与预决算偏离之间呈现正相关关系;税收计划刚性过强会对税务部门产生逆向激励,并发现税收计划与预决算偏离之间并非简单线性关系,而是倒U型关系,拐点大约在15.5%。
Based on the theory of political incentive and tax effort, the paper establishes a theoretical model and proposes two hypotheses. Based on the inter -provincial balanced panel data from 2000 to 2012, the paper constructs a dynamic empirical model. In addition, the paper mainly analyzes the influences of over - the - planned GDP growth and tax - plan on the budget revenue forecast error of the local government by SYS - GMM method. The main conclusions are as follows ： Fimtly,under the promotion incentive, the local governments have strategic impact the planned GDP growth rate as well as actual GDP growth rate, and the over - the - planned GDP growth lays the foundation for excess budget revenue ; secondly, under the pressure of rigid tax - plan, the tax departments have to strengthen the effort of tax collection, and the relationship between tax - plan and revenue forecast error shows a positive correlation;thirdly, excessive pressure of rigid tax - plan would produce a reverse incentive to the tax departments, and the relationship between tax - plan and budget revenue forecast error is not a simple linear but a inverted U - shaped relation with the inflection point at about 15.5%.
出处
《云南财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第3期27-39,共13页
Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
