摘要
本文以沪深证券市场2006-2011年A股上市公司为样本,研究了银企关系对成本费用粘性的影响,研究结果表明,银企关系降低了企业成本费用粘性,并且这种效应主要存在于国有企业中以及2008年金融危机之后.这说明银企关系作为一种监督机制,有助于缓解管理层的机会主义行为,从而降低了企业的成本费用粘性.在进一步的研究中,我们将银企关系进行了区分,发现不同类型的银企关系对成本费用的影响存在显著差异,银行持有企业股权的银企关系最能够监督经理人降低成本费用粘性.本文的研究发现为银企关系存在的合理性提供了证据,有助于更全面理解银企关系发挥作用的机制和情境,丰富了银企关系研究领域的文献.同时也推进了有关成本费用粘性的相关研究,对进一步抑制经理人机会主义行为,降低企业的成本费用粘性具有启示意义.
This paper investigates the impact of the banking connection on the cost stickiness. Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from A shares between 2006 and 2011, it shows that the banking connection has reduced the costs of sticky in company and the effect mainly exists in the state-owned enterprises and happens in the wake of the financial crisis in 2008. This illustrates the fact that the banking connection, as a kind of supervision mechanism, helps to alleviate the opportunistic behavior of management and reduce the cost stickiness. At the same time, the further results show that the effects of different types of the banking connection on the cost stickiness are different, and the connection of bank holding the equity in company can lead managers to minimize the cost of sticky. The conclusions of this paper can provide the evidence of the reasonableness of the banking connection, contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the mechanism and context of the banking connection, and enrich the relevant research in this field. What＇s more, this paper also plays a role of alleviating the opportunistic behavior of management and reducing the cost stickiness.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第4期928-938,共11页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家社科基金一般项目"银企关系对企业风险的影响研究"(14BJY206)
关键词
银企关系
成本和费用粘性
监督效应
企业产权
金融危机
banking connection
cost stickiness
supervision mechanism
property rights of enterprises
the financial crisis
