摘要
幸福一直是伦理学的重要问题。与古代不同,当代人对幸福的讨论是通过权利来进行的,权利是人获得幸福的前提和关键。罗尔斯等人通过"基本善"来阐述权利,其实是指明了一个人在社会生活中获得幸福的基本物质条件。阿玛蒂亚·森把可行能力作为权利的关键概念,从而进一步指出了幸福不能仅仅是外在条件的满足,更是个人能力的应用和展示。森对能力的表达借助了亚里士多德的功能说,功能与德性有着密切的联系,功能从目的论意义上是人之为人的优秀性所在,因而能力与德性概念在价值意义上具有某些共性。从权利到能力最终到德性的论述说明,权利概念可以脱离现代规范伦理的抽象形式,回到对人的价值和生存意义的拷问,从而在德性维度下重新定义和理解幸福。
Happiness has always been an important issue in ethics. Differing from that in the ancient time,contemporary discussion about happiness takes rights as the premise and key to obtain happiness in life.When Rawls and other philosophers explain rights with 'primary goods',they effectively point out the fundamental material conditions for happiness in social life. Amartya Sen regards capability as a key concept for rights,stressing that happiness is not only about the meeting of external conditions,but it is all about the application and display of personal capability. Sen's concept of capability comes from Aristotle's theory of function. In Aristotle,function and virtue are closely linked in the sense that the function of human beings demonstrates in a teleological way the excellence,and consequently the value of human beings. Sen's discussion of happiness from rights to capability and then to virtue shows that we can go beyond the abstract context of modern normative ethics and understand rights in the context of human value and the meaning of life on the one hand,and we can also re-examine and re-define happiness from the perspective of virtue on the other.
出处
《华东师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期56-62,169,共7页
Journal of East China Normal University（Humanities and Social Sciences）
基金
2014年上海市教委阳光计划资助项目"制度教化的德性维度"(13YG04)的阶段性成果
关键词
权利
能力
德性
幸福
rights,capability,virtue,happiness
