摘要
文章从上市公司高管激励的视角探求公司现金流操控行为产生的原因,具体将高管激励划分为显性激励和隐性激励,同时以现金流操控的三类报告动机为调节变量,探究高管激励与现金流操控的关系是否受到报告动机因素的干扰。通过对我国A股上市公司1999-2012年数据实证检验,发现高管薪酬刺激了现金流操控,高管持股比例能抑制现金流操控,高管隐性收益减少现金流操控,频繁的高管变更易滋生现金流操控;三类报告动机均显著调节了高管激励与现金流操控的关系。
This paper explores the reasons of cash flow manipulation from the perspective of senior executive incentive of listed companies, and classifies senior executive incentive into explicit incentive and implicit incentive. Meanwhile, the paper, taking three types of report motivation of cash flow manipulation as moderating variables, probes into whether the relationship between senior executive incentive and cash flow manipulation will be affected by the report motivation factors. After making an empirical test on the data of Chinese A-share market from 1999 to 2012, we find that senior executive incentive stimulates cash flow manipulation, the proportion of senior incentive shareholding restrains cash flow manipulation, implicit gains of senior executive reduce cash flow manipulation, and companies with a high senior executive turnover rate breed easily cash flow manipulation. We also notice that three types of report motivation moderate the relationship between senior executive incentive and cash flow manipulation significantly.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期163-176,共14页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71472148
71402141)
中国博士后科学基金项目第54批面上项目(2013M542313)
中国博士后科学基金项目第55批面上项目(2014M550505)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2014G6234027
2014G6231007
2013G6232013)
陕西会计学会2014科研重点课题(sxkj2014036)
关键词
现金流操控
高管激励
报告动机
调节作用
cash flow manipulation
senior executive incentive
report motivation
moderating effect
