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Stackelberg博弈下海盗活动地区海军护航选择优化 被引量:8

Optimization of Zone Selection of Naval Escort in Pirates Active Areas Based on Stackelberg Games
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摘要 为了优化海军在海盗活动区域的护航选择决策,更好地保护过往船舶,维护海上运输安全,在对实际护航行动涉及的海军与海盗两方主体博弈关系分析的基础上,建立了一个包括海军和海盗双方在内的非合作非零和Stackelberg博弈对双方行为进行描述,并选取双层规划模型将博弈关系进行数学转换.针对该双层规划模型的特点,采用基于灵敏度分析的启发式算法(SAB)对反应函数具体形式进行计算,并进行模型求解算法设计.最后,以索马里海盗活动区域为例进行实例分析,得出海军继续选择亚丁湾进行护航,海盗活动区域将向红海转移的结果,结果也说明了模型与算法的合理性. To optimize the zone selection of naval escort for enhancing maritime security in pirates active areas. Firstly, the decision behaviors of the naval force and pirates in such areas are systematically analyzed. Secondly, a non-cooperative non-zero sum Stackelberg game is developed. The game builds the interactive relationships among the naval force and a pirate, which also can be described as a bi-level programming model. In order to solve this model, a heuristic algorithm called SAB is designed. Finally, the Somali pirates are taken as an example to implement the calculation. The results show that the best selection of naval escort zone is still the Gulf of Aden, while the pirates will be more willing to choose the Red sea area. The results also prove the rationality of models and the algorithm.
出处 《交通运输系统工程与信息》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2014年第6期152-157,共6页 Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology
基金 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(11JZD049)
关键词 水路运输 海军护航优化 STACKELBERG博弈 海上通道安全 双层规划 waterway transportation optimized selection of naval escort Stackelberg games safety of sea line of communication bi-level programming model
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