摘要
基于传统的Bertrand与Stackelberg博弈,构建了一个三阶段质量博弈模型。在Bertrand博弈下,市场不存在高质量产品优势。在Stackelberg博弈下,市场存在先发优势。比较两种博弈,先行动企业利润增大,后行动企业利润减少。同时,企业产品质量差异、价格差减小,说明先后博弈下产品竞争加剧。模型的均衡结果为两企业都采取先行动策略,即进行Bertrand博弈。最后,分析了先行动企业遏制与后行动企业进入策略,揭示了企业是否进入市场,以及提供何种质量的产品取决于先行动企业先发优势与后行动企业进入成本两难冲突比较的权衡。
Based on traditional Bertrand and Stackelberg games, we construct and study a three-stage quality game model. In the Bertrand game, there is no advantage for producing high quality product for the market. In the Stackelberg game, there is a first-mover advantage in the market. For both the two games, we show that the profit of the first-moving firm increases while the profit of late-moving firm decreases, and the quality and price differences decrease, which explains that the competition is more fierce in Stackelberg game than that in Bertrand game. The equilibrium of the model is that both firms take the first-moving strategy, namely, choosing the Bertrand competition. We analyze the strategy that first- moving firm deters and the late-moving firm enters, and show that whether the firm choose to enter the market, and what kind of quality products to provide, depend on the trade-of{ between the degree of advantage of the first-mover and the cost of entering for the late-mover.
出处
《系统管理学报》
CSSCI
2014年第6期804-809,818,共7页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271195)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项项目(1092050205113560)
