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企业国际化经营、股价信息含量与股权激励有效性 被引量:34

Corporate Internationalization,Stock Price Informativeness and Equity Incentive Effectiveness
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摘要 本文研究了我国上市公司国际化经营背景下,对经理人采用股权激励的有效性,并进一步分析其激励作用有效的内在机理。研究结果表明,对我国国际化经营企业的经理人,并不适用于股权激励。但股权激励失效的原因,在国有企业与非国有企业有所差异。国有企业的股权激励建立在股价信息含量基础之上,符合现代股权激励有效的前提条件,导致股权激励失效的主要原因是国际化增加了股价信息含量的噪音,对于非国有企业而言,导致股权激励失效的主要原因是,股权激励并未建立在股价信息含量基础之上,更多的属于福利性质。据此,研究者针对性地提供了改进不同类型国际化经营企业公司治理的对策建议。 This paper studies the effectiveness of equity incentives to managers in Chinese listed companies under the background of international operations,further analyze its intrinsic mechanism. The results show that it is not suitable for the implementation of equity incentive for managers in international business corporations. But the reasons for the failure of equity incentives differ in state- owned enterprises and non- state- owned enterprises. The equity incentive in state- owned enterprises is established upon the stock price informativeness,which is in accordance with premise condition of modern equity incentive,the main cause of failure of equity incentive is that internationalization increases the noise in stock price informativeness,and equity incentive is not built on stock price informativeness,has more welfare nature,these lead to the failure of equity incentive in non- state- owned enterprises. Accordingly,researchers provide countermeasures for improving corporate governance in different types of international operation enterprises pertinently.
出处 《会计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第11期46-53,97,共8页 Accounting Research
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71102181 71172228) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630253) 西南财经大学中央高校创新团队项目"基于国际竞争力的中国企业成本管理创新"(JBK130508) 西南财经大学"中央高校基本科研业务费"项目(JBK130405)的资助
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