摘要
亚里士多德在《尼各马可伦理学》的第一卷中通过目的论论证与功能论证得出幸福是最高的善与灵魂合乎德性的活动,而在第十卷中,幸福却变成了仅仅与智慧同一的思辨活动。这显然是两种对立的观点,体现出亚里士多德思想的不一致之处,同时也引发后世思想家对幸福是涵盖论或理智论的论争。但通过细入分析亚里士多德对幸福的目的论、功能论证及外在善的佐证,可以将其幸福观解释为一种温和的涵盖论——阶梯幸福观。在阶梯幸福观中,思辨活动是首要的幸福,而合乎德性的活动则是第二位的幸福,同时过实践生活所需要的外在善也包含其中。
In the First Volume of Ethika Nikomachea,Aristotle makes a teleology argument and function argument to demonstrate that happiness is the highest good in accordance with the virtue. But in Volume Ⅹ,happiness turns into the contemplation that identifies with wisdom.Obviously, the two contradictory opinions imply the inconsistence of Aristotle and trigger a continuous debate a-bout whether happiness is inclusive or just intellectual among later generations.However,through deep analysis into the teleology argument,function argument and external good evidence,we can in-terpret Aristotle＇s view about happiness into a mild inclusive theory-multistep happiness.In multi-step happiness,contemplation is the first happiness,and the activity in accordance with virtue is the secondary,and the external good that we need to live a practical life also includes in it.
出处
《宝鸡文理学院学报（社会科学版）》
2014年第5期13-17,共5页
Journal of Baoji University of Arts and Sciences：Social Science Edition
关键词
亚里士多德
幸福
涵盖论
理智论
Aristotle
happiness
the Inclusive Theory
the Intellectual Theory
