摘要
文章以上海市政府控股的国有上市公司2006-2012年发生的并购行为为样本,研究了地方政府干预对并购价值效应的影响。结果显示:上海市政府在"四个中心"建设过程中推动的国资企业并购在短期内产生了正的财富效应,若干窗口下的累计超额收益显著高于民营企业。但是这种正财富效应不具有持续性,其长期市场表现反而弱于民营企业。实证结果表明并购虽然是实现资本配置、扩大企业规模的最有效手段,但却难以为股东创造价值,因此企业应以谨慎的态度对待并购。从长期来看,地方国有企业的资本配置效率弱于民营企业,这说明并购应更多地遵循市场化原则。
Based on M＆A cases of state-owned listed companies controllect Dy shanghai mu nicipal government from 2006 to 2012, this paper examines the impact of local government inter- vention on M＆A value effect. It comes to the conclusions that M＆A of state-owned listed com- panies advanced by Shanghai municipal government in the process of ＂four-center＂ construction has the positive wealth effect in the short run, and cumulative excess returns under certain win- dows are obviously more than ones of private enterprises. But this positive wealth effect is not featured by persistence and the long-term market performance of state-owned listed companies is weaker than the one of private enterprises instead. Empirical results show that M＆A is the most effective tool for realizing resource allocation and enlarging firm scale, but is hard to create values for stockholders. Therefore, firms should adopt a cautious line towards M＆A. In the long run, the efficiency of resource allocation in local state-owned enterprises is lower than the one in pri- vate enterprises, showing that M＆A should more abide by market principles.
出处
《上海财经大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第5期39-47,共9页
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社科规划基金项目(13YJA630092)
关键词
政府干预
并购
价值创造
government intervention
M＆A
valve creation
