摘要
构建实体店和网店间的Betrand博弈模型以及实体店,网店和供应商间的Stackelberg博弈模型,以供应链成员都为公平中性时的供应链均衡策略为参照,对比研究实体店的横向公平偏好和纵向公平偏好对供应链均衡策略变化的影响.研究结果表明:实体店的横向公平偏好和纵向公平偏好将导致零售价格、批发价格以及各方的效用发生不同的变化;实体店较弱的横向公平偏好能够提高供应链整体效用,而只有实体店较强的纵向公平偏好才能够提高供应链整体效用.
A Betrand game model between online and physical stores, and a Stackelberg game model among online, physical stores and suppliers are built respectively. Then the fair neutral supply chain equilibrium strategy is taken as a reference with the consideration of the physical store＇s fairness preference, and how the horizontal fairness and vertical fairness of physical stores impact the equilibrium strategies of supply chain is studied. Results show that the horizontal and vertical fairness preference of the physical store may change the equilibrium strategies of supply chain and will cause different changes on retail price, wholesale price as well as the utility of the parties. The physical stores with weaker horizontal fairness preferences can improve the overall effectiveness of the supply chain, and only the stores with stronger vertical fairness preferences will improve the overall effectiveness of the supply chain.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2014年第4期527-536,共10页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371086)
江苏省高校人文社科优秀创新团队建设资助项目(2013CXTD011)
