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“公平理论”和“角色理论”视域下的企业反倾销行为决策 被引量:2

Study of Companies' Anti-dumping Behavior Decision Based on “Fair Theory” and “Role Theory”
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摘要 反倾销成本与反倾销收益的权衡是国内企业反倾销行为选择的依据。基于角色理论构建了企业反倾销行为的收益矩阵和期望收益函数模型,并进一步分析了存在主导企业和不存在主导企业两种市场格局下国内企业反倾销行为决策方案的选择问题;在此基础上,引入公平理论对企业决策方案进行横向和纵向公平性识别。研究发现:反倾销成本、反倾销收益及行业内其他企业的反倾销申诉概率等因素制约企业最终的反倾销行为决策,两种市场格局背景下国内企业有13种反倾销行为决策方案;发挥行业协会的协调机制,可以有效规避企业间因不公平而采取的"报复"行为。 The comparison of anti-dumping costs and benefits are the basis of a domestic enterprise’s anti-dumping behavior choice. Based on the role theory, this paper constructs earnings matrix and the expected revenue function model of enterprise import anti-dumping behavior decision,and further analyzes domestic enterprise anti-dumping behavioral decision scheme selection problem under two kinds of market structures:whether there is leading enterprise or no dominant ones. On this basis, the fair theory is introduced to the enterprise decision scheme to identify the horizontal fairness and vertical fairness recognition.Researches show that:cost of anti-dumping, anti-dumping earnings and other enterprise anti-dumping complaints probability in the industry restrict enterprise anti-dumping behavioral decision finally. Under the background of the two kinds of market structure domestic enterprises there are 13 kinds of anti-dumping behavioral decision scheme. Exert the industry association coordination mechanism can effectively avoid the enterprise“revenge”behavior because of inequity.
机构地区 中南大学商学院
出处 《中南大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 2014年第4期23-30,共8页 Journal of Central South University:Social Sciences
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71272068) 湖南省哲学社科基金重点项目(2010ZDB51) 教育部博士点基金项目(20130162110074) 中南大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(2014ZZTS126)
关键词 进口反倾销 反倾销行为 公平理论 角色理论 import anti-dumping anti-dumping behavior Fair Theory Role Theory
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