摘要
解决信息不对称问题是按揭贷款制度的核心思路。信息不对称对于按揭贷款市场结构具有破坏作用,由此形成对按揭贷款制度立法方式的影响,中美两国的按揭贷款制度在立法结构上存在差异,原因是对于信贷风险、证券化风险以及系统性风险中信息不对称情况下各方主体义务的差异。我国目前强调通过外部监管解决信息不对称问题,但随着信息不对称的复杂化,总的立法方向是银行风险控制体系的自主化与政府外部监管的间接化。从外部制度与市场的关系考虑,必须明确制度的发展路径;从内部制度之间的关系考虑,必须清晰各制度在风险控制体系内的职能。
This paper is focus on the coordination of mortgage loan’s risk control system which is mainly to solve the information asymmetry problem. By analyzing the reason of recent years’mortgage case in Shanghai,it can be identified that the core problem of mortgage risk control system is the information asymmetry,and then to make a comparison between China and abroad risk control system in two historical dimension,the pragmatism and the formalism,it can be determined three benchmark:the basic risk control system,the off-balance business risk control system and systemic risk control system,which can give a basic to analyze the whole system through empirical data. The general idea of risk control system’s development is through the indirection of external supervision and autonomy of bank’s internal risk control system to improve the efficiency,but there exist difference in different stages to achieve this goal,which deserve to form the different roles and functions of government and banks.
出处
《中国流通经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第8期122-128,共7页
China Business and Market
基金
2013年上海高校青年教师培养资助计划"房地产市场调控政策的经济法分析"(项目编号:ZZzq12004)
华东政法大学研究生创新能力培养专项资金项目"我国按揭贷款风险监管法制研究--以资产证券化为中心"(项目编号:20131001)的阶段性研究成果
