摘要
在高速公路PPP项目中,PPP项目公司和政府之间的目标存在一定的差异性,前者以自身利益最大化为目标,后者则是以最大限度地提供公共服务为最终目标。正因为PPP项目公司与政府的目标与利益往往是相悖的,所以如何有效解决委托人政府与代理人PPP项目公司之间的代理问题是确保项目能够顺利进行的重要因素。为了避免PPP项目公司的投机行为,基于委托代理理论对高速公路PPP项目激励问题进行研究。通过在激励模型中加入易于观测并能体现社会福利的政府补偿指标,建立信息对称和信息不对称下的激励模型并求解,分析各项指标对项目公司积极性的影响。通过激励PPP项目公司靠近政府的目标与利益,使项目公司在获取自身收益的同时还能兼顾政府想要追求的社会福利,从而避免高速公路PPP项目中可能出现的投机行为。
In the expressway PPP project,there are differences between PPP project companies and the government.The former aims at maximizing their own interests,while the latter has the ultimate goal of maximizing the public services provision.As the objectives and interests between PPP project companies and the government are contrary to each other,the relationship between principal government and agent PPP project companies is an important factor influencing the operation of the project.To avoid the speculative behavior of PPP project companies,this paper studies the incentive problem of expressway PPP project based on the principal-agent theory.By adding government compensation index that can be easily observed to reflect social welfare,an incentive model under information symmetry and asymmetry is established.The influence of each index to the project companies'enthusiasm is analyzed.By motivating PPP project companies to achieve the similar goals and interests with government,the project company can not only obtain its own benefits but also pursue social benefits concerned by the government.The findings o.f this study can avoid possible speculation in the expressway PPP project.
作者
莫俊文
周妍汝
殷怡
MO Jun-wen;ZHOU Yan-ru;YIN Yi(School of Civil Engineering,Lanzhou Jiaotong University,Lanzhou 730070,China;Changzheng Engineering Co.Ltd.Lanzhou Branch,Lanzhou 730010,China)
出处
《工程管理学报》
2019年第1期73-78,共6页
Journal of Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金地区科学基金项目(70961004)
