摘要
假设公司发行可转换债券和普通股,揭示薪酬激励和可转换债券对公司资本结构和管理者的风险转移动机的影响。研究发现,公司最优杠杆与管理者的持股比例呈正相关,与固定薪水呈倒U型关系;管理者的风险转移动机与管理者的持股比例呈正相关,与固定薪水和可转换债券的转换率呈负相关。研究表明,薪酬激励显著影响公司资本结构,可转换债券能显著减弱管理者的风险转移动机,合理的薪酬激励机制能有效地减弱管理者的道德风险。
The influence of managerial compensation and convertible debt on capital structure and managerial risk-shifting incentives for a company issuing convertible debt and equity was investigated.It is found out that the optimal leverage ratio of firm first increases with the manager’s ownership stake and increases first and then decreases with the manager’s fixed salary.The managerial risk-shifting incentives increase with the manager’s ownership stake,and decrease with the managerial fixed salary and the conversion ratio of convertible debt.These results imply that capital structure is greatly affected by managerial incentives,and convertible debt can significantly mitigate the managerial risk-shifting incentives.Therefore,the proper design of managerial compensation can significantly reduce managerial moral hazard.
作者
唐小林
杨招军
TANG Xiaolin;YANG Zhaojun(School of Finance and Statistics,Hunan University,Changsha 410079,China;Department of Finance,Southern University of Science and Technology,Shenzhen 518055,Guangdong,China)
出处
《系统管理学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第1期123-133,共11页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71371068)
国家自然科学基金创新群体资助项目(71521061)
关键词
可转换债券
管理者薪酬
管理者的风险转移动机
convertible debt
managerial compensation
managerial risk-shifting incentives
