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博弈论视角下的高校科研实验室安全教育制度建设研究 被引量:15

Analysis of the safety-stressed education regulations for the research-focused university laboratories from the point of view of game theory
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摘要 通过分析我国高校实验室安全教育现状,建立管理人员与做试验人员的博弈模型,计算雅可比矩阵的行列式及迹,分析做试验人员及管理人员的博弈动态趋势及稳定性相位情况,研究双方博弈策略变化及进化稳定策略(Evolutionarily Stable Strategy,ESS),得出理想策略模型及优化条件。结果表明,不同参数设置对双方的收敛速度有显著影响。参数设置不科学时,做试验人员策略及管理人员策略可能收敛于1,也可能收敛于0;而参数设置合理时,做试验人员策略及管理人员策略都可以收敛于1。对理想模型中的参数进行了优化,结果表明,增加学生方未参加培训时的惩罚j及增加管理人员培训时获得的绩效收益b等,都可以有效提高收敛速度。研究结果可以帮助高校管理层对安全教育体系进行定量分析,制定更加科学合理的安全培训制度,从而有利于建设平安校园,以及提高高校学生的综合素质。 This paper is intended to make an investigation and analysis of the current situation of the laboratory safety education in our colleges and universities over the country via a game theory model.In the said game theory model,the game players can be said divided into two sides.One of the said two sides depends on the laboratory manager whereas the other depends on the experiment performers,usually,the students from the given university.For the research purpose,the present author intends to pursue the game strategy changes both of the aforementioned sides through an analysis of the dynamic trend and the stability of the game theory model,that is,the determinant & trace of Jacobi matrix and ESS(evolutionarily stable strategy).And,then,we have been trying to build up an ideal game theory model based on our research results,which indicate that different parameter settings may have a significant impact on the convergence type and speed of the strategic changes of the two sides.For example,when the parameter setting is irrational or illogical,the strategic changes of the experiment performers and the manager may converge to 1 or to 0.On the contrary,if the experiment parameter setting is reasonable or rational,the strategy changes of the experiment performers and its administrative manager can both be able to converge to 1,which may allow us authors to optimize the parameter settings of the ideal model.For instance,if the penalty of the non-participation in training of the experimenters and the reward of training of the manager can be improved,it would be possible to increase the strategy convergence speed of the experimenters and the manager promptly.At the same time,it would also be possible to optimize the other parameter settings of the income value of the manager for doing other kinds of work,so as to raise the penalty amount of the poor training of the experimenters.Therefore,the present paper can be in a position to offer a quantitative scientific analysis of the safety management for such laboratories in the cou
作者 陆紫生 王如竹 罗伟莉 柯霞 LU Zi-sheng;WANG Ru-zhu;LUO Wei-li;KE Xia(Institute of Refrigeration and Cryogenic Engineering,School of Mechanical Engineering,Shanghai Jiao T.ong University,Shanghai 200240,China)
出处 《安全与环境学报》 CAS CSCD 北大核心 2018年第6期2273-2278,共6页 Journal of Safety and Environment
基金 教育部高等学校能源动力类专业教育教学改革项目(NDJZW2016Y-41) 上海市科委项目(17142201800) 上海交通大学实验室创新研究课题(16SG-002,17SG-01)
关键词 安全社会科学 实验室 安全教育 博弈 制度建设 safety social science labs safety education game theory institution building
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