摘要
在现代企业的法人治理结构中 ,在所有权与经营权相分离的前提下 ,由于企业的投资者作为委托方与企业的经营者——代理方双方信息的非对称 ,将导致经营风险的增加。为此 ,力图根据双方信息可能出现的三种典型情形 ,探讨委托方如何依据不同的情况为代理人设计具有一定激励和约束力的报酬机制 ,最大限度地刺激代理人实现委托方的利益最大化。
In the structure of legal person administration of modern enterprises, ownership is separated from managerial authority ,under the premise of which crisis management increases because the investor of the enterprise is the trustor and the manager at the same time--information asymmetry of both agencies. Therefore, according to the three typical information situations that both parties might be involved in ,this paper probes into the ways the trustor designs the pay mechanism with considerable urging and binding force for the attorney, who will work for the realization of the largest benefit for the trustor.
出处
《重庆邮电学院学报（社会科学版）》
2001年第4期19-21,共3页
Journal of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications
