摘要
公共体育场馆后期经营中普遍存在开放率低下的现象,这主要是因为场馆经营中形成的委托代理关系中利益约束机制不明显,激励机制不到位导致的.在政府作为前期主要资本投资者的前提下,利用非对称信息委托代理模型,分析场馆后期经营中的委托代理关系,针对如何监督场馆后期经营的委托方以及委托方的风险利益驱动如何加以规避等问题提出了相关建议.
The common low opening rates in later management of public gymnasiums and stadiums results from inconspicuous constraint mechanisms and ineffective incentive mechanisms in principal-agent relations forming in the process of management. The study analyzes the principal-agent relations in the later management of public gymnasiums and stadiums and shows how to construct the constraint conditions which aims at supervising consignor and how to implement their risk aversion of benefit drives by using the principal-agent model of asymmetric information based on the fact that the government is the main capital investors in the earlier stage.
出处
《河南师范大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
北大核心
2014年第3期185-188,共4页
Journal of Henan Normal University(Natural Science Edition)
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(10YJC880028)
关键词
公共体育场馆
委托代理
非对称信息
风险规避
public gymnasiums and stadiums
principal-agent model
asymmetrical information
risk aversion
