摘要
研究了电力联营体 (Power Pool)中发电公司的报价策略。在非完全竞争的 Power Pool中 ,发电公司可以作为一个价格接受者 ,也可利用其市场势力操纵市场价格。发电公司作为价格接受者时将基于边际成本曲线报价 ,但其最低报价必须根据市场行情而变化 ;具有市场势力的发电公司可以采取限制产量、抬高电价的策略。 Power Pool中市场势力的存在不利于资源的优化配置和利用。
This paper studies the bidding strategies of generation companies in Power Pool. In an imperfect competition Power Pool, some generation companies (GenComs) may have market power. A GenCom can bid as a price acceptor or as a price changer. A price acceptor will bid according to its marginal cost curve, but the minimum bid price must be decided by dynamic programming based on price forecasting. A price changer will bid according to the strategy of restricting output and forcing up price. The Power Pool will be inefficient when market power of GenComs are strong.
出处
《电力系统自动化》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2001年第6期12-15,共4页
Automation of Electric Power Systems
关键词
电力市场
竞价策略
电力工业
电力联营体
发电公司
中国
Competition
Cost accounting
Dynamic programming
Electric power generation
Electric rates
Strategic planning
