摘要
商业银行在日常的经营活动中,必然会承担一定的风险。因此,相比已有的讨论货币政策和银行风险承担行为的研究,本文研究的核心问题是货币政策对银行过度风险承担行为的影响。本文在理论模型的基础上,用银行业贷款审批条件指数来测度银行过度风险承担行为,经实证发现,在宽松的货币政策环境下,银行会放松贷款审批条件,从而承担过度的风险。本文建议央行在货币政策调控过程中应同时采取逆周期的资本调节措施来抵消货币政策对银行过度风险承担产生的影响,并对央行实施逆周期资本调节的频率、步幅和时机,以及存款准备金率的逆周期调节作用提出了明确建议。
In the everyday business activities, commercial banks have to take some risks. Thus, comparing to the existing research that discussed monetary policy and bank risk-taking behavior, the core issue of this paper is the effect of monetary policy on bank excessive risk-taking behavior. On the basis of theoretical model, we use lending standards to measure bank risk-taking behavior, after empirically test we find that, in the loose monetary policy environment, banks will soften lending standards, and take excessive risks. We suggest that, the central bank, during the monetary policy adjustment process, should take counter-cyclical capital regulation policy to offset the effect of monetary policy on the excessive risk-taking behavior of banks. We also propose the frequency, pace and timing of the counter-cyclical capital regulation policy, as well as the counter-cyclical effect of the deposit reserve ratio for the central bank.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第6期73-85,共13页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家社科基金重大项目"构建我国金融宏观审慎政策框架研究"(项目号:11&ZD016)
北京市属高等学校高层次人才引进与培养计划项目的资助
项目号:YETP0137~~
关键词
过度风险承担
货币政策
逆周期资本调节
主成分分析
Excessive Risk Taking
Monetary Policy
Counter-Cyclical Capital Regulation
Principal Component Analysis
