摘要
从信号博弈的角度解释经济转轨时期商业银行与企业之间的信贷行为,分析了转轨时期我国商业银行大量不良债权形成的微观机理; 指出转轨时期的一些特殊因素使得信贷抵押、担保等都难以成为企业对银行发出的有信息价值的信号,制度上的规定也使得信贷利率失去信号的作用. 企业的信贷参与约束条件很容易得到满足,从而信贷博弈难以达成银行所期望的分离均衡. 转轨时期银行的信贷参与约束条件也较容易达成,而后期较大的清算交易费用使得大量的不良债权滞留下来.
In the paper, it is tried to explain some credit behaviors of Chinese commercial bank in the period of economic transition. The micro-mechanism for forming large amount of bad credit assets in commercial banks is analyzed. Collateral and co-signer's collateral could hardly provide informational signals due to some special factors in the period. The banking administr-ation system also makes credit interest rate lose its signal function. Enterprise's individual participation constraint condition can be very easily satisfied, so the credit game could not reach separating equilibrium which the bank would expect. In the period, the individual rational constraint condition of bank is also easily fulfilled. However, the post stage big transaction cost in liquidation leads to accumulation of large bad assets in banks.
出处
《上海理工大学学报》
CAS
北大核心
2001年第1期49-52,共4页
Journal of University of Shanghai For Science and Technology
