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三级竞争供应链的渠道选择研究 被引量:1

Research on Channel Selection of Three-level Competitive Supply Chains
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摘要 在供应链链间竞争的背景下,研究三级竞争供应链的纳什均衡结构。利用非线性规划、纳什博弈和Stackelberg博弈理论,分析了2条三级竞争供应链的渠道选择问题,求解了3种情景:全分布式结构;全一体化结构和混合结构(一条供应链为一体化,另一条为分布式)下的决策变量的最优解,并分别依据3种决策标准,即制造商利润最大化、渠道利润最大化和供应链系统利润最大化,分析了不同决策标准下供应链纳什均衡结构。研究表明,三级竞争供应链的纳什均衡结构,依赖于产品之间的替代系数及决策标准,并且当供应链链间的竞争强度较大时,无论何种决策准则下,全分布式结构均为供应链的纳什均衡结构。 The Nash equilibrium structure of three-level competitive supply chains is addressed under the background of inter-chain competition. The problem is modeled by nonlinear programming, Nash game theory, and Stackelberg game theory, respectively. Based on these models, optimal solutions are obtained under three scenarios: fully distributed structure, fully integrated structure, and hybrid structure in which one supply chain is integrated and the other is distributed. Then, channel selection for two three-level competitive supply chains is analyzed. In this way, the Nash equilibrium structure is obtained based on three different decision criteria: the profit maximization of manufacturer, profit maximization of channel, and profit maximization of supply chain system. Results show that the Nash equilibrium structure of three- level competitive supply chains depends on the coefficient of product substitution and the decision criteria. However, when the competition intensity between supply chains is strong, no matter what decision criteria is applied, the fully distributed structure is the Nash equilibrium structure of a supply chain.
作者 魏玲 姚锋敏
出处 《工业工程》 北大核心 2014年第2期78-84,共7页 Industrial Engineering Journal
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301036 71171069) 黑龙江省自然科学基金资助项目(G201013)
关键词 三级竞争供应链 博弈理论 渠道选择 均衡分析 three-level competitive supply chains game theory channel selection equilibrium analysis
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