摘要
本文借助于国际货币政策协调理论,引入金融危机这一极端的负面外部冲击,构建了中美两国货币政策协调模型,并通过不合作、领导-跟随以及合作三种模式进行货币政策博弈分析。从理论模型中发现,无论是货币政策不合作模式还是美国领导、中国跟随的货币政策协作模式都无法使两国货币政策效果达到帕累托最优,只有两国实施具有合作性质的货币政策才能够达到货币政策效应最大化。
In recent years, with the financial integration going further, monetary policy implementation in one country has much deeper influence on other countries. In this paper, we built a monetary policy coordination model between China and the U. S. , based on international monetary policy coordination theory, and introduced the financial crisis as a negative shock. We make a game analysis through three patterns： noncooperation, leader- follow and cooperation. From the theoretical model we find that whether to choose one of the first two models can＇t reach the condition on Pareto Optimality between these two countries. Therefore, China and the U. S. should hold the cooperative attitude; only in this way can these two countries reach to the win-win cnn^t~rl,lenre_
出处
《亚太经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期38-42,共5页
Asia-Pacific Economic Review
关键词
货币政策协调
博弈
中美
Monetary Policy, Policy Coordination Theory, China and the U. S.
