摘要
经济激励机制是地方政府土地违法违规行为产生的重要原因之一,通过调整利益分配关系,能够弱化经济激励机制,遏制地方政府的土地违法违规行为。利益分配关系的调整包括三个方面:一是对不同级别地方政府的土地收益进行调整;二是对失地农民、国家及边远地区农民三者之间的土地收益进行调整和规范;三是以事权和财权相匹配为基础,对中央政府和地方政府的财政收入份额进行调整,以增加地方政府的财政收入,弱化其对"土地财政"的依赖。
For the delinquent behavior on local government lands,one of a most important reason for its generation is economical impelling.This article gives the expounding that through adjusting relations of assigning profit and weakening this impelling we can get restrains for it.The relations of assigning profit contain three ways：first is adjust the profit for different periods of local governments;second is adjust and regulate the profit between landless peasants,remote area peasants and the nation;last is based on matching administrative power and financial power,we can adjust the central and local governments＂ financial quotient to increase the local governments＂ financial revenue and weaken its dependence on ＂land finance＂.
出处
《行政与法》
2013年第11期14-19,共6页
Administration and Law
基金
国家社科基金项目"地方政府农地非农化失范问题及其制度规制研究"的阶段性成果
项目编号:11BFX064
关键词
地方政府
利益分配
土地
违法违规
local governments
assign profit
lands
delinquent behavior
