摘要
本文使用2004—2009年我国143家商业银行的贷款结构数据，研究了资本监管与银行贷款结构之间的关系，以此检验现行资本监管制度的有效性。结果发现，现行的资本监管制度能有效引导商业银行的贷款配置行为，资本约束的存在使得资本不足的商业银行发放更多的低资本消耗型贷款，个人贷款比例上升，信用贷款的比例下降；资本水平较高的银行则会发放更多的高资本消耗型贷款以提高贷款收益，信用贷款的比例上升，个人贷款比例则下降。此外，资本水平对贷款结构的影响还存在一定的规模差异，资本约束机制对小银行更有效。本文的发现为监管当局的资本监管制度提供了经验证据，并提出了差异化监管的政策建议。
This paper studies the effect of capital regulation on the behavior of banks＇ loan allocation in China. Using 143 commercial banks＇ unbalance panel data, we find out that capital regulation have important effect on the behavior of banks＇ loan allocation. Banks will adjust loan structure according their capital status after 2004. Capita/-adequacy bank hold more highly - capita/consumption loan, the credit loan ratio rise, however, the under - capital bank hold more low - capital consumption loan, the private loan ratio rise. We also find the difference of bank loan allocation behavior between bank sizes. All these found provide evidence for the policy of capital regulation.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期123-137,共15页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(11BJY045)
教育部人文社科研究规划基金项目(12YJA790172)的阶段性成果
吴玮得到上饶银行股份有限公司科研基金资助
关键词
资本监管
贷款结构
差异化监管
Capital regulation, Loan structure, Differentiation regulation
