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日本强化农业保护的经济与政治原因 被引量:21

Research on the Economic and Political Factors of the Improvement of Agricultural Preservation in Japan
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摘要 日本长期对本国农业实行支持与保护政策,在全球多边农业谈判和双边自由贸易谈判中始终拒绝大幅降低农业保护水平。近年来,在多哈农业谈判受阻和世界经济萧条的背景下,日本政府又通过立法强化了农业保护。本文采用政治经济学的分析方法,在全面论述日本农业保护政策的基础上,着重分析了其经济背景和政治原因,基本结论为:日本顽固的农业保护政策有其深厚的政治经济背景,今后也难以发生根本性的改变。 In order to support and protect agriculture, Japan's government implemented a series of preservation policies over a long period of time. In global multilateral agricultural negotiations and bilateral free trade nego- tiations ,Japan persistently refused to largely lower the agricultural preservation level. In recent years, Under the backgrounds of Doha round agriculture negotiations being hampered and world economy being recessive, Japan's government additionally strengthened the agricultural preservation through legislation. By means of po- litical and economic analysis and based on the comprehensive explanation of Japan's agricultural preservation polices, this article focuses on the economic background and political reasons of agricultural preservation poli- cies in Japan and concludes that Japan's stubborn agricultural preservation policies have its deep political and economic backgrounds and the situation is difficult to change fundamentally in future.
作者 李勤昌 石雪
出处 《现代日本经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第2期48-58,共11页 Contemporary Economy OF Japan
基金 辽宁省教育厅科学研究项目"WTO农产品贸易制度改革背景下的辽宁农业国际竞争力研究"(W2012169)
关键词 农业保护 经济原因 政治原因 利益集团 选举制度 agricultural preservation economic factor political factor interest group electoral system
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