摘要
制度监管的缺失加剧了我国公立医院的寻租行为。通过溯源制度缺陷,研究引入寻租动态博弈模型,分析了公立医院的寻租活动,所得博弈均衡解证实了寻租之必然,其中惩罚和监督成本是影响寻租的重要要素。以制度空隙弥补为原则,提出创新监督治理机制、完善法律制度,强化声誉机制和道德约束等制度来消散寻租行为。
The absence of institutional supervision has worsened the rent-seeking behavior of Chinese public hospitals.The dynamic game model is employed to analyze the rent-seeking activities of public hospitals.The gaming equilibrium has confirmed the inevitability this sort of behavior and it shows that the cost of punishment and supervision counts much.It is suggested that institutional supervision should be strengthened,the related legal system improved,and that reputation and moral constraint be applied.
出处
《扬州大学学报（人文社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2013年第6期34-38,45,共6页
Journal of Yangzhou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
公立医院
寻租
治理
博弈
public hospitals
rent-seeking
governance
game
