摘要
在信贷市场上,银行满足于较低利率,而不愿意提高贷款利率以支持更多的企业信贷,这种现象被称为信贷配给。Stiglitz和Weiss的信贷配给模型基于银行和企业信息不对称假设,提出逆向选择效应是银行不愿提高利率的主要原因。结合中国金融制度,发现即使在信息对称情况下,只要存在利率限制,信贷配给现象仍然存在;而企业给予银行的信息越真实,银行的实际平均收益越高。因此,完善企业信用体系建设,降低银行信息收集成本,可以有效提高企业从银行融资的可得性,并降低企业融资成本。
In the credit market,banks are satisfied with lower interest rates and not willing to raise lending rates to support more enterprise credit. This phenomenon is known as the credit rationing. Based on the assumption of asymmetric information between banks and enterprises,Stiglitz and Weiss( 1981) 's credit rationing model puts forward to the adverse selection effect,which is the main rea- son that banks are reluctant to raise interest rates. In this paper,combined with China's financial sys- tem,we find that even in the case of symmetric in- formation,as long as there are restrictions on in- terest rates,the credit rationing phenomenon still exists. Moreover,when enterprises provide banks more authentic information, the actual average bank earnings are higher.
出处
《暨南学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第12期17-26,157,共10页
Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词
信贷配给
信息不对称
利率限制
Credit rationing
asymmetrical information
interest rate limit
