摘要
我国村级会计委托代理制存在两种现实模式:一是以浙江省为代表并在全国范围内普遍推广的"村账镇代理"模式,另有广东佛山市推行的由会计师事务所代理村会计核算的"村账所代理"模式。本文运用演化博弈论原理,对社会中介参与村级会计委托代理的可行性、优势及其运行模式作出分析,提出"村账所代理"即由社会中介(如会计师事务所)代理村级会计更符合我国农村财务管理的现实和发展趋势。
In China, the village accounting principal-agent system has two modes： one is the ＂village accounting by township agent＂ mode that is a representative practice in Zhejiang Province and is promoted widely in the whole country; the other is the ＂village accounting by firm agent＂ mode that is adopted by Foshan City, Guangdong Province, in which village ac- counting services are provided by accounting firms. This article, using prin^ples of evolutionary game theory, analyzes the feasibility and advantages of the participation of social intermediaries in the village-level accounting principal-agent operation, and proposes that the ＂village accounting by firm agent＂ mode with social intermediaries （ such as accounting firms） is more in line with the reality and trend of financial management in rural China.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期56-63,共8页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金
浙江省哲学社会科学基金资助项目(08WTGL001YB)
关键词
村级会计
委托代理制
社会中介
演化博弈论
village-level accounting
principal-agent system
social intermediary
evolutionary game theory
