摘要
官僚政策执行理论与自由裁量权问题是街头官僚理论研究的核心。村委会作为国家政策输入到农村的重要载体,对农地流转政策的有效执行起着决定性作用,而村委会所具有的类街头官僚特征,以及在农地流转过程中的多重角色冲突,使其表现出特殊的政策执行逻辑,即利己性选择。利己性选择凸显了村委会的私益偏向,阻碍了农地有效流转并严重影响着国家对农村社会的政治整合力。实现对村委会政策执行中的权力规制,需要从权力与权利关系层面建构起国家、村民和村委会三者之间的平衡性制度安排。
The core of the street-level bureaucrat theory research is mainly about the bureaucrat policy implementation and administrative discretion. As an important carrier of the national policy to the countryside, the village committee plays a major role in the effective implementation of the farmland transfer policy. However, because of the street-level bureaucrat characteristic and the multiple-role conflicts in the process of the farmland transfer, the village committee displays the special policy implementation logic of selfish choice, which exposes the village committee＇s private benefit deviation, hinders the farmland transfer effectively and affects seriously the political conformity of the country to the rural society. The power regulation of the village committee in the policy implementation needs the construction of a balanced system among the nation, the villagers and the village committee from the perspectives of power and power-benefit relations.
出处
《河南大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期26-32,共7页
Journal of Henan University(Social Sciences）
基金
河南省软科学研究计划项目"河南省农地流转中的地方政府行为与职能优化研究"(132400410296)阶段性成果
河南省政府决策研究招标课题"河南省加强和创新社会管理问题研究"(2013B076)阶段性成果
关键词
街头官僚理论
村委会
农地流转
政策执行逻辑
权力规制
street-level bureaucrat theory
village committee
farmland transfer
policy implementation logic
authority regulation
