摘要
从有限理性角度出发,采用演化博弈论建立了考虑政府监管的煤矿企业安全投资的演化博弈模型。分析了博弈双方的复制动态方程及动态进化过程,揭示了博弈双方的行为特征及其对稳定状态的影响。分析了四种情况下的演化稳定策略,预测了煤矿安全投资的长期稳定趋势。同时分析了政府奖励、处罚和安全事故对煤矿安全投资的影响。结果显示降低煤矿安全投资成本、降低检查成本、提高惩罚力度等都将使煤矿安全投资朝着良好的方向演化。最后提出了相关的政策建议。为煤矿企业的安全投资和政府的监督管理提供了有益的指导。
From the view of limited rationality , base on the evolutionary game theory ,an evolutionary game model of the safety investment considering government supervision in coal mine enterprise is established .The replicated dy-namic equation and the dynamic evolution process of the both gaming parties are analyzed .The behavior features of the two gaming parties and the affect to the stability status are revealed .The four kinds of evolutionary stability strat-egies are analyzed and the long-time stable tendency of coal mine safety investment is predicted .Also the paper an-alyzes the influence of the government incentives , penalties , and security incidents on mine safety investment .The results show that measures including reducing the cola mine safety production cost , reducing the monitoring cost and improving the penalty are all enable coal mine safety supervision game toward the better direction evolution . Article concludes with some policy recommendations .For coal mine enterprises safety investment and government supervision and management , the theoretical and methodological useful guide is provided .
出处
《中国安全生产科学技术》
CAS
CSCD
2013年第11期65-71,共7页
Journal of Safety Science and Technology
基金
四川省哲学社会科学重点研究基地-四川矿产资源研究中心资助项目(SCKCZY2012-YB005)
关键词
煤矿安全投资
演化博弈
复制动态
稳定策略
coal mine safety investment
evolution game
replication dynamic
stable strategy
