摘要
从自由现金流和银行贷款两方面考量2007～2010年沪深A股民营上市企业政治关联对企业非效率投资的影响.结果表明,存在政治关联民营企业容易利用自由现金流和银行长期贷款进行过度投资;存在地方政治关联的民营企业,其自由现金流的过度投资更严重,中央政治关联企业则存在更多利用长期贷款进行过度投资的行为.同时,投资不足的民营企业政治关联降低了企业投资对于自由现金流和银行短期贷款的依赖;中央政治关联的民营企业投资对于银行长期贷款的敏感度更高,地方政治关联企业未发现类似的显著影响.
In the paper, the effect of political connections on inefficient investment behavior of enterprises is explored from the aspects of free cash flow and bank loans, combining the data of private listed companies between 2007 and 2010. It is found that politically connected firms tend to use free cash flow and long term bank loans for over investment. This kinds of situation are more serious for these enterprises with local political connections, while things like overinvest- ment of long term bank loans are more frequently taken place in enterprises with central political connections. The results also show that political connections reduce their reliance on free cash flow and short term bank loans for these underinvestment enterprises. Investments of firms with central political connections are more sensitive to long term bank loans, however, that has not happened in firms with local political connections.
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第6期34-39,共6页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社科基金重点项目(10AXW001)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-08-0186)
高校博士点专项科研基金项目(200805320025)
关键词
政治关联
自由现金流
银行贷款
非效率投资
Political connection
Free cash flow
Bank load
Inefficient investment
