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关联并购的股权融资偏好动机及其绩效影响:基于中国上市公司的实证研究 被引量:5

The Equity Financing Preference Motive and Performance Effect of M&A with Related Party:Empirical Study Based on Chinese Listed Companies
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摘要 首先界定了关联并购的概念和范围。在前人关于大股东和终极控制人掏空和支持行为研究的基础上,根据我国上市公司的外部环境特征,提出了我国上市公司关联并购的股权融资偏好动机。按照关联并购前上市公司是否满足配股要求,将我国1998-2004年间发生关联并购的上市公司的样本划分成两类。通过关联并购前后一年的盈利性财务指标的配对样本t检验,分别验证了满足配股要求的上市公司在关联并购后绩效有明显下降,存在掏空行为;未满足配股要求的上市公司在关联并购后绩效有明显上升,存在支持行为。 First of all, the concept of "M&A with related party" was defined. Then, we classified the MARP into two parties --tunneling and propping, based on the samples of Chinese listed companies during the period 1998 -2004. Using paired sample t test, we found that when the listed company meets the requirement of allotment of shares, the MARP is tunneling; if not, the MARP is propping. The results showed that the performance of tunneling MARP of meeting the requirement of allotment of shares had significant decline between the year after the MARP and the year before the MARP; the performance of propping MARP which did not meet the requirement of allotment of shares had significant improvement.
作者 陈健 贾隽
出处 《华侨大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 2013年第3期113-120,共8页 Journal of Huaqiao University(Philosophy & Social Sciences)
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(13BGL054) 陕西省教育厅项目(2013JK0186)
关键词 关联并购 动机 掏空 支持 M&A with related party (MARP) motive tunneling propping
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