摘要
主要研究理性秘密共享协议过程中,由于参与者的序贯行动所引起的不可置信威胁的问题.给出一个更加通用的满足计算k-resilient纳什均衡的(m,n)理性秘密共享协议(k<m),该协议可以消除不可置信威胁.与之前协议不同的是,当有参与者背离时,其他人并不选择中断协议,而是对背离者进行连续足够轮数的惩罚.在这个协议中,子秘密的更新并不需要在线分发者,而是通过参与者协商随机数来进行更新.
We investigate the incredible threat issue caused by players＇ sequential actions in a rational secret sharing protocol.We propose a general rational secret sharing protocol satisfying k-resilient（m,n） Nash equilibrium which eliminates incredible threat.In our protocol,when some player deviates from the equilibrium,other players do not choose to abort but instead they continuously punish the deviator in enough runs.We do not need online distributor in our protocol but instead we use the negotiated random numbers by participants to update shares.
出处
《中国科学院大学学报（中英文）》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第4期539-546,共8页
Journal of University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
基金
国家重点实验室基金(Y1Z0081102)资助
关键词
秘密共享
博弈论
扩展博弈
序贯均衡
secret sharing
game theory
extensive game
sequential equilibrium
