摘要
利用演化博弈中的动态复制方法,以城市内城区的机动交通群与非机动交通群为研究对象,对机动交通与非机动交通随机配对后,根据鹰鸽博弈的思想建立了博弈双方的收益矩阵.讨论了交通执法频率、范围和力度等模型参数,易发生交通拥堵路段的机动交通与非机动交通违规选择的影响,解释了城市交通拥堵的部分原因:出行者的个人素质因素和地方政府交通执法因素.
By using of the evolutionary game theory based on bounded rationality,proposes a dynamic unsymmetrical replicating model of motorized and non-motorized transport.Motorized and non-motorized transport are randomly paired based on the idea of hawk-dove game payoff matrix of the game.This paper discusses the impact of the model parameters：the traffic enforcement frequency,scope and intensity of the city.The reasons of urban traffic congestion have been explained：the traveler’s personal quality factors and local government traffic enforcement factors.
出处
《河南科技学院学报（自然科学版）》
2013年第3期90-94,共5页
Journal of Henan Institute of Science and Technology(Natural Science Edition)
基金
2012年河南省政府决策研究招标课题(2012B252)
