摘要
我国已建立以颁发"两证一书"为主要内容的开发控制体系,既往研究指出现有开发控制体系存在制度约束力不足、行政人员罔置规划和随意调整规划指标等问题。但是,这些研究主要采用理论辨析、经验总结和个案分析方法,其研究结果是否能够反映现有开发控制体系的整体运行效果仍值得质疑。本文以制度主义"结构—参与者"模型为基本分析框架,以北京市朝阳区住宅开发项目为例,通过定量分析得出现有开发控制体系中,房地产开发企业所拥有的政治和经济资源会影响其获取住宅用地的开发权,但对开发过程中规划指标调整的作用并不明显,与住宅项目"两证一书"审批过程确定性相关的主要因素为土地出让方式、单位面积土地出让金和颁发项目选址意见书与用地规划许可证的间隔时间。
China＇s development control system, also known as ＂one permission and two certificates,＂ has gained considerable attention of urban planners. Through several individual case studies, it shows inefficiency of the current development control system on regulating planning staffs, who readjust regulatory detailed plans at random in development process. However, these study results are still questioned on its generality and objectivity. The paper tries to fill the gaps by integrating the institutionalism ＂structure-participants＂ model with the quantitative empirical analysis. By analyzing residential developments in Chaoyang District of Beijing, the study shows that the political and economic resource of real estate companies impact their access to land development fights. While in the development control process for ＂one permission and two certificates,＂ political and economic resources of individual agencies lose their influence to ways to acquire land development rights, land remise funds, and time gap between the permission notes for location and the land use planning certificate.
出处
《城市规划》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期29-34,共6页
City Planning Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71073166)资助研究成果
关键词
开发控制
住宅开发
新制度主义
development control
residential housing development
new institutionalism
