摘要
创建基于行为博弈的税收遵从均衡模型,将处于相同税收境况的纳税人视为一个群体,则个体纳税人选择税收遵从策略从纳税人群体角度来看就是以一定的概率选择该种策略。面对正常税务检查与严格税务检查并存的环境,纳税人税收遵从博弈稳定均衡策略形成不但取决于税制的特性,而且依赖于其他纳税人的税收遵从决策。依据税收遵从博弈均衡的形成机理,提出建立我国税收遵从激励监督机制的对策。
This tax compliance harmonious model basing on behavioral game is constructed. Regarding the taxpayers in a certain condition alike tax circumstances as a colony, a taxpayer selects tax compliance strategy can be treated a probability from the point of the colony of the taxpayers. Confronted with circumstances in which the normal tax administration checking and the strict tax administration checking coexist, a taxpayer＇s tax compliance game stable strategy-making not only depends on taxation particularity, but also depends on the tax compliance strategy of other taxpayers. According to formation mechanism of tax compliance game balance, some suggestions have been provided about establishing the encouragement and monitoring system in tax compliance.
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期84-87,共4页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目"基于行为博弈的税收遵从实证研究"(71173242)
教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目"纳税人收入差距影响税收遵从的实证研究"(10YJA790121)的中期成果之一
中南大学2011~2012年中央高校专项研究经费的资助
关键词
行为博弈论
税收遵从
纳税人
均衡模型
Behavioral game theory
Tax compliance
Taxpayer
Balance model
